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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
THE MEANING OF "GENERAL" POWERS OF
APPOINTMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX

By

GEORGE GuMP*

Section 302(f) of the Revenue Act of 1926' provides
that there shall be included in the value of the gross estate
of a decedent the value of "any property passing under a
general power of appointment exercised by the decedent"
by will or by deed made in contemplation of or intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death.
Section 803(b) of the 1932 Act 2 broadens this provision to
some extent by providing that the value of the property
subject to the general power, should be included in the gross
estate if the power be exercised by a deed wherein the decedent retained possession, enjoyment or income from the
property or reserved the right to control further its devolution either alone or in conjunction with others. Similar
provisions are found in the 1924, 1921 and 1918 Acts.'
There is the usual reservation exempting bona fide sales
made for adequate consideration.
The cumulative effect of these provisions may fairly be
stated to represent an attempt on the part of Congress to
tax property subject to a general power of appointment to
the same extent and under the same conditions as property
belonging absolutely to the decedent.'
This paper will be
limited to a discussion of the meaning of the word "general" as it is used to limit and qualify the particular type
of powers of appointment, the exercise of which will bring
into effect the imposition of the estate tax. In other
words, this paper deals with the difference between "general" and "special" powers of appointment as applied to
the estate tax.
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1930, Johns Hopkins University;
LL.B., 1933, University of Maryland. Lecturer on Trusts and Future
Interests, University of Maryland School of Law.
144 Stat. at L. 9, 71, C. 27 (1926).
247 Stat. at L. 169, 279, C. 209 (1932).
8 43 Stat. at L. 253, 305, C. 234 (1924) ; 42 Stat. at L. 227, 279, C. 136
(1921) ; 40 Stat. at L. 1057, 1097, C. 18 (1918).

' See Report of Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, H. R. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 21.
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Prior to the Revenue Act of 19181 there was no section
of the Revenue law dealing specifically with property passing under a power of appointment, whether general or special, but, nevertheless, the Treasury Department ruled that
property passing under a general power of appointment
was to be considered as a portion of the gross estate of a
7 the
"decedent appointor. ' ' 6 In United States v. Field,
Supreme Court invalidated this Regulation, holding that
the Revenue Act of 19168 could not support a construction
which would tax property subject to powers of appointment.
Even before the decision in United States v. Field had been
announced Congress had amended the Revenue laws to provide specifically for the taxation of general powers.9
The distinction between general and special powers has,
of course, not been created by the Revenue Acts, but was
known to the Common law.'0 Mr. Gray defines the distinction as follows:
"Again, powers are either general or special. Under a general power an appointment can be made to
any one, including the appointing donee. Under a
special power an appointment can be made only to
certain persons or objects, or to certain classes of persons or objects other than the donee. Special powers
are sometimes called limited powers.""
The Treasury Regulations follow much the same thought
in stating that "Ordinarily a general power is one to appoint to any person or persons in the discretion of the donee
of the power. If the donee is required to appoint to a specified person or a class of persons, the property should not
be included in his gross estate."' 2 The use of the word
"required" seems to be unfortunate, as a power may be
special or limited, i. e., not general, even though there is no
requirement that the donee appoint to any one. The
5 Supra

note 3.
'Treasury Regulations 37, Art. XI.
255 U. S. 257, 65 L. Ed. 617, 41 S. Ct. 256 (1921).
839 Stat. at L. 756, 777 C. 463.
9 Supra note 7.
10 Farwell on Powers, 8th ed., (1916) p. 8.
121
2 Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers, (1911) 24 Harv. L. Rev. 511.
Treasury Regulations 80, Art. 24.
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thought of the Regulation could be better expressed by substituting "may only" for "is required to". There is at
once apparent a gap or a sort of "no man's land" between
the contrasting definitions of a general power and a power
"not general" or special, as many conveyances can be
imagined which do not permit the donee of a power to
appoint to everyone or anyone including himself, but yet
do not restrict his appointment to a specified person or a
class of persons.1 3 For example, assume that the creating
conveyance permits the donee to appoint a fee by deed or
will to any person, firm or corporation whatsoever except
the donee himself, or his personal representatives or estate,
or assume that the donee may appoint by deed or will to
anyone, including himself, except the donor's mother-inlaw. In each of the illustrations, the donee's power certainly is not an all inclusive one as respects the possible
appointees, yet neither is it restricted to a "specified person
or class of persons". Some powers do not restrict the
possible appointees, but the method of appointment is restricted, as in the familiar situation where a donee may
appoint only by will. Further, a power may be unrestricted
as to grantees, but yet its exercise may be conditioned upon
an event which may or may not happen. Whether the
powers illustrated and others of similar nature are general or special cannot be decided from a reading of the Act
itself, but the answers are being developed by the decisions of the Federal Courts. Before discussing the decisions dealing with specific circumstances such as are suggested by the above illustrations, it is believed that it is first
necessary to consider the effect of state law upon the general question.
EFFECT OF STATE LAW

The incidents of powers of appointment are, of course,
not uniform among the various states, the most discussed
difference with respect to the Federal estate tax being concerned with whether or not the property subject to the
power constitutes a part of the donee's estate for the pur18Leach, Cases and Materials on Future Interests, 578, note 2.
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pose of paying claims of creditors.14 The taxpayer has
contended in a proportionately large number of Federal
cases construing the statute that Congress did not intend to
tax property subject to a power except in those states where
the property formed a part of the decedent's estate for the
benefit of creditors" and such an argument has been uniformly rejected.1" The reasoning of the Federal Courts
is well exemplified by the opinion of Judge Kirkpatrick in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Company v. McCaughn quoted and adopted by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on appeal.17 In the
Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Company case the father of the
decedent had created a trust by his will, which was to endure for the lives of all of his grandchildren in being at his
death and for twenty-one years thereafter. Each of the
father's seven children was given the power to appoint,
either by deed or will, one-seventh of the trust fund, the
devolution of the income of the share so appointed to take
effect upon the death of the donee and that of the principal
of the share so appointed to take effect only upon the termination of the trust. The decedent, one of the seven children, died in 1922 and exercised the power of appointment
as to her one-seventh interest by appointing the income to
her granddaughter for life and then the principal to such
persons as her granddaughter might appoint. Under the
applicable state law (Pennsylvania) neither the income nor
the principal of the property appointed formed a part of
the decedent's estate for the benefit of creditors. In dealing with the contention that as the property was not subject
to the claims of creditors and, therefore, was not to be taxed,
Judge Kirkpatrick said:
"When the Congress passed the act of 1919 and
added to the property which it had already included
z

See discussion in United States v. Field, supra note 7.

15 Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 1 F. (2d) 987 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1924);

Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, 21 F. (2d) 164 (C. C. A. 3rd 1927), aff'g., 15
F. (2d) 591 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1926) ; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, 34 F. (2d) 600 (C. C. A. 3rd 1929), Cert. Den'd. 280 U. S. 602, 74
L. Ed. 647, 50 S. Ct. 85 (1929) ; Stratton v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 48
(C. C. A. 1st 1931), afr'g., 42 F. (2d) 779 (D. C. Mass. 1930), Cert. Den'd.,
284 U. S. 651, 76 L. Ed. 552, 52 S. Ct. 31 (1931).
IC Supra note 15.
17 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 15.
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in the gross estate of the decedent for tax purposes
property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent, its purpose could only
have been to extend the incidence of the tax to property
which had not previously been subject to it. If the
plaintiff's position were correct, section 402(e) of that
act would have added no new subject to those already
selected for taxation. In that event its purpose could
only have been to clarify the act of 1916. But that
suggestion was expressly rejected by the Supreme
Court which considered the effect of the act of 1919 in
U. S. v. Field, though that act had been passed too late
to directly affect the case then before the court."
"The Congress thus had the power to tax any transmission of property effected by death even though by
the law of the decedent's domicil such property was not
part of his estate. In view of the construction of the
act of 1916 given by the court in U. S. v. Field, the enactment of section 402(e) of the act of 1919 indicates
a clear intent to exercise that power. The question
of an intent to act in harmony with state laws does
not arise. In the sense that the act of 1919 did not
create any diversity in the incidence of the tax in the
different states it operated in harmony with the state
laws. In the sense that it included a subject of taxation which in no state was part of the decedent's estate,
the Congress was acting in disregard of state rules of
property. '"8
Judge Dickinson expresses the thought in another manner
by stating: "It is just as true, however, that no state can,
by declaring the law of property to be different from what
it is in other jurisdictions, force the hand of Congress in
respect to how the tax shall be admeasured."19
In order that the tax may be imposed with any degree
of uniformity between the states the Federal Courts have
necessarily been compelled to disregard any distinction
based on the liability of the property to creditors, as is exemplified by the following quotation, again from Judge
Dickinson:
Is Ibid, 602, 60.
19 Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 15, 1 Fed. (2) at 988.
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"In construing any legislative enactment, aid may
be sought from the situation unaffected by the legislation; the need which was felt for a change, and the
change sought to be effected. This is the time-honored
phrase of 'the old law; the mischief and the remedy.'
So far as this leads us to delve into the legislative
mind, we have found that the motive for the adoption
of the phrase in question was to bring about as nearly
as it could be reached a uniformity throughout the
United States in the admeasurement of the tax. If it
was measured 'by the estate passing,' there was no
such uniformity for the reason that what constituted
the estate of a decedent received a different answer in
different states. There was the additional motive of
effect it formed
making property taxable, if in practical
20
part of the decedent's estate."
The Federal Courts, therefore, have determined that the
mere fact that some of the most important incidents of
powers may differ from state to state will not in itself cause
a differing application of the taxing statute as between the
residents of the various states. In order to find out, however, what the incidents of a particular power may be, the
Federal Courts must look to the state law. 1 Thus, in Helvering v. Grinnell,22 the Supreme Court, in a case involving
the exercise, vel non, of a general power of appointment,
said: "We think the reasoning of the New York Court as
to the meaning and application of the state law equally applies to the federal statute here in question." 2 3 In Leser v.
Burnet,24 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found it necessary to construe a power of appointment granted by the
will of a resident of Maryland, dealing with property
20 Whitlock-Rose

v. McCaughn, supra, note 15, 15 Fed. (2) at 591.
1 Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153, 79 L. Ed. 825, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935),
Af'g, 70 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d 1934); Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn,
supra note 15; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 15;
Blackburne v. Brown, 35 F. (2d) 963 (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1929) Aff'd. 43 F.
(2d) 320 (C. C. A. 3rd 1930); Stratton v. United States, supra note 15;
Wear v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 3rd 1933); Lee v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 399 (Ct. App. D. C. 1932), Cert. Den'd. 286 U. S. 563,
76 L. Ed. 1295, 52 S. Ct. 645 (1932) ; Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C.
A. 4th 1931); Pennsylvania Co. v. Lederer, 292 F. 629 (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1921).
22 Supra note 21.
23 Ibid, 294 U. S. 153, 156, 79 L. Ed. 825, 828, 55 S. Ct. 354, 355 (1935).
2, Supra note 21.
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located in Maryland. In discussing the effect of state law,
Judge Parker said:
"We come, then, to the question as to whether the
power created by the conveyance of Charles Carroll
Fulton, the language of which we have quoted above,
is a general power within this meaning of the act of
Congress. This is to be determined by the law of
Maryland; for, while we look to the federal decisions,
and in the absence of such decisions, to the general
law, in interpreting the act of Congress, we look to the
law of Maryland as laid down by its courts to determine the effect of conveyances executed within that
state and relating to property there situate. 2 5
It can now no longer be a matter of dispute that insofar
as this taxing statute is concerned, the Federal Courts will
look to the state law to determine the meaning and effect
of the particular power of appointment in question; the
Federal Courts must look to the state courts to determine
the rights of creditors of the donee,2 6 to determine to whom
the donee may appoint, 7 to determine whether or not the
appointee is to be considered as taking from the donor or
donee, 28 and other matters of similar import. It is, however, equally well settled that once those incidents and
effects are determined by the applicable state law, the Federal courts must still make an independent conclusion as to
whether or not those incidents and effects constitute, in the
particular case, a "general" or a "special" power.
Suppose, however, that the state statutes or decisions
have attempted to define a general power and have classified
powers as general or special in a manner differing from the
interpretation given those expressions by the Federal
Courts. There is then an apparent conflict between the two
principles above outlined.
In Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn,29 the contention seems
to have been made that the power under consideration was
Ibld, 46 F. (2d) 756, 760.
Fidelity Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 15; Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, supra note 15; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn,
20

supra note 15; Stratton v. United States, supra note 15.
17 Leser v. Burnet, supra note 21.

28 Stratton v. United States, supra note 15; Wear v. Commissioner, supra

note 21; Pennsylvania Co. v. Lederer, supra note 21.
29 Supra note 15 (District Court).
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a New Jersey power, that it was exercisable only by will,
that the New Jersey courts did not call such a power a general one, and that, therefore, the power was not a general
power. The Court ruled against this contention, holding
that the common law did not classify powers as between
general and special by looking at the mode of exercising
the power, but rather by the absence of limitations when
exercised. The Court relied on the "uniformity" theory,
but did not expressly comment upon the contention that the
state law did not use the term "general" as applied to
the power in question. On appeal,8" the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals seems to have given some weight to the
argument of the tax payer, holding, however, that under
the New Jersey law the power in question was a general
power since it was subject to the donee's debts. The Court,
therefore, found the tax payer's interpretation of the state
law to be erroneous and so was not forced to decide the
precise point of the effect of the state court's definition."
2
In Fidelity-PhiladelphiaTrust Co. v. McCaughn," the
power considered was a Pennsylvania power which did not
authorize the appointment of a fee. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, adopting the opinion of the lower court,
8 a decision of the
referred to Thompson v. Garwood,"
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in which it was stated that
"a general power is, in regard to the estates which may be
created by force of it, tantamount to a limitation in fee . . .
because it enables him [the donee] to give the fee to whom
he pleases". Because of other remarks of the Court in
Thompson v. Garwood the Federal Court held that the
above quotation did not necessarily mean that the state
court had defined a general power in such a way as to exclude all powers granting to the donee the right to appoint
less than a fee. The significant part of the opinion, however, is that the Court further said:

30 Supra note

15 (Circuit Court of Appeals).

"'The Court relied on Crane v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 99 N. J. Eq.
164, 133 A. 205 (1926) which does not directly decide whether the power
there involved was general or special, although the intimation is that the
Court considered it general.

a1Supra note 15.
883 Whart. 287, 305, 31 Am. Dec. 502, 506 (1837).
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"In any event, however, the exact definition adopted
by the court in Thompson v. Garwood is not necessarily binding upon this court in construing a tax statute."
In Blackburne v. Brown, 4 the question of whether or
not a Pennsylvania power exercisable by will alone was a
general power within the meaning of the estate tax was
involved. The Court quoted from the opinion below as follows:
"But I do not think that the meaning which the
courts of Pennsylvania have given to the expression
'general power of appointment,' whatever it may be,
is binding upon this court in construing those words
in an act of Congress imposing an inheritance tax." 4 '
again, therefore, establishing the rule in the Third Circuit
that definitions of the state courts are not controlling.
In Helmholz v. Helvering, 5 the Board of Tax Appeals
took the opposite view. The power in question in the Helmholz case reserved to the decedent only the right to appoint
income from the corpus of the trust and only for the lifetime of the appointee. The power to appoint was restricted to a natural person or a charitable organization.
The major contention of the Government was that the property subject to the power was taxable as a transfer by the
decedent in trust with the right to alter, amend or revoke
the trust, but as an alternative contention, the Government
argued that the power was a general power. The Board
of Tax Appeals rejected both contentions and in dealing
with the latter, quoted a Wisconsin statute86 which restricted the use of the term "general" to a power which
authorized alienation in fee. The Board therefore held
the power to be a special power. It is to be noted, however, that the Third Circuit had decided four years earlier
in dealing with a Pennsylvania power that the mere fact
that the power did not authorize the appointment of a fee
did not keep it from being a general power."' The opinion
Supra note 21.
-a 43 F. (2d) 322.
" 28 B. T. A. 165 (1933).
Wisconsin Statutes (1927) Sec. 232.05 and 232.06.
8 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 15, and see
8,

United States v. Field, supra note 7.
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of the Board of Tax Appeals, therefore, can only be rationalized on the theory that the Board gave binding effect to
the Wisconsin statute because it specifically stated what
should and what should not be considered a general power.
On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals"8 and the Supreme Court" the question of whether the power was a
general one was not discussed, as the Government seemed
to have abandoned this point.
There appears to be no justification for the Board's
decision in the Helmholz case with respect to the binding
effect of the law of Wisconsin. If the desired uniformity
is to be attained, a power in one state which has the same
incidents and effects as a power in another state should
receive the same treatment from the Federal taxing authorities regardless of what name or designation each state gives
to the power. To give a binding effect to the definitions
of state courts and legislative acts could well cause injustices under the Revenue Act. Suppose, for example, a
decedent in state A has a power of appointment by will
which restricts his possible appointees by providing that
property may not be appointed to his estate, but is otherwise unrestricted; assume further that by statutory definition such a power is called a general power in state A.
Assume further that in state B the decedent has a power
exercisable only by will which is absolutely unrestricted as
respects the possible appointees, and state B, by statutory
definition, has classified such power as a special power
because it can only be exercised by will. If a binding effect
is to be given to the definition of the two states, the power
in state A would be taxable, while the power in state B
would not, although the rights of the decedent in state B
are far greater than those of the decedent in state A.4 °
The Federal Courts should, therefore, exercise their own
judgment and follow their own decisions with regard to
defining powers as general or special, regardless of state
law, and should look to the state law solely to find out what
88 Helmholz v. Helvring, 75 F. (2d) 245 (Ct. App. D. C. 1934).
'8 Helvering v. Helmholz, Commissioner, etc., 2D6 U. S. 93, 80 L. Ed. 76,
56 S. Ct. 68 (1935).
" Cf. Leser v. Burnet, supra note 21.
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the rights of a particular decedent are in property over
which a particular power has been exercised. Nor should
the Federal courts be bound by the definitions of the term
"general" made by state courts or legislatures."'
MODE OF EXERCISE OF THE POWER

In several cases before the Federal courts, it has been
contended that powers exercisable by will alone are not, for
that reason, general powers, 2 but no taxation case has been
discovered where such a contention has been upheld."3
There seems to be no question but that a power exercisable
by will alone may still be a general power since the classification as between general and special should be made with
regard to the possible appointees rather than with respect
to the particular form of instrument which can be used.'
It is, of course, true that where the donee may not appoint
by deed, he cannot appoint to himself and to that extent
the possible appointees are limited. However, if the donee
may appoint to his estate or his creditors, 5 he has all the
practical advantages of being able to appoint to himself.
In addition, at the time when the power is to be exercised,
i. e., at the donee's death, the mere fact that his appointment can only be by will does not restrict his possible appointees since he can at that time appoint to anyone then
46
living.
41 It is interesting to compare the opinion of the Supreme Court in Tyler
v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 502, 74 L. Ed. 991, 998, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930),
where it was held that it was within the power of Congress to impose an
estate tax on property held by husband and wife as tenants by the
entireties in spite of the State law (Maryland) which regarded such a
tenancy between husband and wife as constituting one legal entity. In the
course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Sutherland said: "But mere names and
definitions, however important as aids to understanding, do not conclude
the lawmaker, who is free to ignore them and adopt his own."
"2Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, supra note 15; Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co. v..McCaughn, supra note 15; Blackburne v. Brown, supra note
21; Leser v. Burnet, supra note 21; Lee v. Commissioner, supra note 21;
Johnstone v. Commissioner, 76 F. (2d) 55 (C. C. A. 9th 1935) Cert. Den'd.
296 U. S. 578, 80 L. Ed. 408, 56 S. Ct. 88 (1935).
8 Cf., however, Fidelity-Trust Co. v. McCaughn, supra note 15.
11 Farwell, op. cit. supra note 10; I Simes, Future Interests (1936) 431.
5 Compare the situation in Leser v. Burnet, supra note 21, where under
the applicable state law (Maryland) the donee could not appoint to his
creditors and the power was thus held to be special.
6 See discussion in the last part of this article.
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A more difficult question is presented when the donee
may exercise the power only with the concurrence of some
other person or persons.
In FarmersLoan & Trust Co. v. Bowers,4 7 the decedent
had created a trust reserving only a limited or special power
of appointment. In addition, however, the decedent had
retained the right to revoke the trust with the consent of
the trustee. The Court held that an absolute and unqualified power to revoke a trust is equivalent to a general power,
but that a power to revoke only in conjunction with others
is not a general power. It seems doubtful that a power
to revoke a trust is a power of appointment at all,4 s but
granted, arguendo, that it is equivalent to a power of appointment, why should it be called limited or special merely
because the power cannot be exercised by the decedent
alone? If the distinction between general and special
powers is to be made solely on the basis of the possible
appointees,4 9 it is clear that the mode of exercise, whether
by the donee alone or in conjunction with others, should
make no difference. If, however, the practical result is to
be considered, a donee whose appointment can be checked
by a person possibly adverse to his interests has rights
which are far from those enjoyed by a donee who needs no
consent to his acts and, a fortiori, his rights hardly approach those of an absolute owner.50 It will be noted, however, that the power dealt with in the Farmers' Loan case
was not an ordinary power of appointment at all, but a
power of revocation and thus the rights of the donee were
described as "merely analogous to a power of appoint'7 29 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d 1928).
48 The Court relied on Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 60 L. Ed. 830,
36 S. Ct. 473 (1916), to establish that "an absolute and unconditional
power to revoke a trust is treated as equivalent to a general power to appoint." However, the right to revoke by the settlor of the trust in the
Bullen case was not only to revoke the trust, but to "direct and control the
disposition of" the trust estate.
'1 Supra note 44.
50 Committee Reports, supra note 4. "A person having a general power
of appointment is, with respect to disposition of the property at his death,
in a position not unlike that of its owner. The possessor of the power has
full authority to dispose of the property at his death, and there seems to
be no reason why the privilege which he exercises should not be taxed in
the same degree as other property over which he exercises the same
authority."
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ment. '"' 1 If, however, a true power were granted to a
donee where exercise of the power could be checked by a
possibly adverse person, the result should be the same, not
perhaps from a technical point of view, but from the practical efficacy of such a power when compared to other taxable interests. "2
POWERS WITH RESTRICTED APPOINTEES

As above indicated, "3 the Federal courts have followed
the historical distinction between general and special
powers by classifying as general powers only those where
the possible appointees are unrestricted. Whether or not
the possible appointees are in fact unrestricted can, however, raise interesting questions.
In Fidelity-Trust Co. v. McCaughn,54 the decedent had
a power exercisable only by will and exercisable (except
with respect to $25,000) only during the time she should
remain unmarried. The decedent-donee did in fact remain
unmarried and did exercise the power. It was held that
the property which was the subject of the power should not
be included in the estate of the decedent for the purpose
of the estate tax. The Court said that there was a limitation in respect to the possible beneficiaries "for the reason
that no husband or children of the donee could be such
beneficiaries." 5
This reasoning ignores the fact that as
long as there was any power at all, it was an absolute one.
As long as the power could be exercised, it could be exercised in favor of anyone, including the estate of the decedent; the only time when there could exist any possible
person to whom the donee could not appoint must, by very
definition, be at a time when there was no power in existence at all. The Court reasoned that Congress only intended to tax property subject to a power when the donee
"has actual and practical dominion of the property, as
fully to all practical intents and purposes as if it were
s Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, supra note 47, 29 Fed. (2) at 18.
5 See discussion in Simes, op. cit. supra note 44, at 435.
M Supra note 44.
'Supra note 15.

"Supra

note 15, 1 Fed. (2) at 988.
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owned outright," 6 and again, "Congress . . .has said
that the Act is to apply . . . only when the power is a
'general' one and has been exercised. This we have interpreted to mean a power of disposition as broad as that
which arises out of ownership.'""
Suppose, however, that
the decedent in this case had had a fee simple estate subject
to a condition subsequent and that this condition had been
based on remarriage, so that had the decedent remarried,
her entire interest in the property would have been divested; under these conditions, if the decedent had in fact
not remarried, the conclusion is inescapable that the property would be subject to the estate tax. 8 The decedent in
the case at bar certainly had dominion of the property as
fully as the decedent in the hypothetical case set forth so
far as the effect of the remarriage was concerned. The
Court was influenced by the fact that the exercise of the
power was restricted to a will, but as seen above, 9 that
should have made no difference. Looking at the situation
at the date of the donee's death, she certainly had "a power
of disposition as broad as that which arises out of owner-

ship.

,60

The Fidelity Trust case seems to have been overruled by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Fidelity-Philadelphia
Trust Co. v. McCaughn.6' In this case, the power could
be exercised as to the principal of a trust fund only to take
effect upon the termination of a trust which was to exist
until 21 years after the death of the last surviving grandchild of the donor living at his death; thus the decedentdonee could appoint no beneficial interest in the corpus of
the trust to those grandchildren. The Court held the power
to be a general one on the theory that the limitation arose
from the inherent nature of the property itself and was not
a condition affecting the possible appointees. This decision
56 Ibid.
57Ibid.
51 Montedonico, Adm'r. v. Commissioner, 12 B. T. A. 572 (1928), where,
however, the condition was not remarriage.
59Supra note 42. In Whitlock-Rose v. McCaughn, supra note 15, the
same judge who decided the Fidelity Trust case held that a power exercisable by will alone was a general power.
60What disposition was made of the $25,000 does not appear from the
report of the case.
*1Supra note 15.
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seems to be entirely correct. The property which was the
subject of the power was analogous to a remainder after
the completion of a life interest; obviously the possessory
interest in the remainder in such case cannot be appointed
to the person or persons who hold the beneficial life interests since they will of necessity be dead before the remainder can vest in possession, but there seems to be no
valid reason why such a power should not be taxed as a
"general" power.
2 the decedent could only exerIn Lee v. Commissioner,"
cise his power by will and only in the event that he predeceased his mother and died without issue. From the nature
of the power, therefore, the decedent-donee could not appoint to his issue. The power was held to be a general one,
although the impossibility of the issue as potential beneficiaries was not expressly discussed. The decision on the
question of whether or not the power was a general one
seems to be correct since as long as the power could be
exercised at all it could be exercised in favor of anyone."
To the same effect is the decision in the Ninth Circuit in
Johnston v. Commissioner."+
In Leser v. Burnet,5 the Court construed the power as
prohibiting the donee from appointing to his creditors
and, therefore, held the power to be a special one. The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to tax property
over which the donee stood in a position not unlike that of
an absolute owner and that such was not the case where
the donee could not subject the property to the payment of
her debts. The Court points out that property subject to
a general power is, by the majority rule in this country
and in England, subject to the claims of creditors of the
donee and that a power which cannot even by express direction of the donee place the property within reach of creditors cannot be called a "general" power. Whatever may
be thought of the rule of the State Court which compelled
e,Supra note 21.
"The qualified disapproval of this case expressed by the Supreme Court
in Helvering v. Grinnell, supra note 21, was on the question of whether or
not the power was exercised; not on the question here discussed.
",Supra note 42.
65Supra note 21.
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this peculiar interpretation of the power involved in the
Leser case,"6 the decision seems to be clearly correct. While
the exercise of the power in this case was not restricted to
a specified class of persons, the limitation against the use
of the property for the payment of the donee's debts must
be said to have deprived her of beneficial rights to the property to such an extent that her interest was far from
approximating that of an owner of the property.
POWER WHERE THE EXERCISE IS CONTINGENT

In the Johnston6 7 case and the Lee6" case, the power
could be executed only in the event of the donee's death
without issue, but at the date of death the contingency had
occurred and the power, therefore, was completely vested.
Similarly, in Minis v. United States69 the power was exercisable only in the event the donee survived her husband
and again it was held that the power was a general one.
No case has been found where the effect of the exercise of
the power was still contingent on the date of exercise. Such
a case could occur where the decedent has a power to appoint by will provided a third party should die without
issue and the appointment is made by the will of decedent
during the lifetime of the third party. It is submitted, that
in such a case the possibility that the contingency may not
occur should reflect upon the value of the decedent's interest in the property, but should not affect the question of
whether or not the power is general or special. Certainly
the control of the property subject to such a power is within
"6The Court felt itself bound by the decision in Balls v. Dampman, 69
Md. 390, 16 A. 16, 1 L. R. A. 545 (1888), which dealt with a devise to E. A.
B. for life with power to "will and dispose of the same in such manner as
she may see fit by any instrument, in the nature of a last will and testament she may see proper to make". The Maryland Court of Appeals, by
way of dictum, held that the donee had no authority to devise the property
for the payment of her debts. This dictum seems to be an oddity in the
law of construction of powers, but the Federal court seems to have been
correct in following it in light of the citation of the case with approval in
Price v. Charbonnier, 103 Md. 107, 63 A. 209 (1906), and Prince de Bearn
Cf., however, Merwin v. Safe
v. Winans, 111 Md. 434, 74 A. 626 (1909).
Deposit & Trust Company, 188 Atl. 803 (Md. 1937).
07 Supra note 42.
as Supra note 21. The power in this case could be exercised only if, in
addition to dying without issue, the decedent predeceased his mother.
69 Minis v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 58 (1928).
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the control of the decedent to the same extent as property
in which he has, at his death, a contingent remainder or
other future interest, depending on the
happening of a con70
possession.
to
it
reduce
to
tingency
CONCLUSION

The comparatively few decisions of the Federal Courts7 '
defining general powers of appointment have tended to
brush aside distinctions based on form rather than substance. The decisions have further tended to reconcile, for
purposes of taxation, the divergent rules of the state courts
and legislatures as to the effect of various powers of appointment. While an amendment of this portion of the
Revenue Law or a more detailed article in the Estate Tax
Regulations might serve to clarify the present definition and
perhaps anticipate questions which have not yet been presented to the Courts, it is believed that the existing interpretations developed by the Federal Courts are, on the
whole, so reasonable that a revision of the law is not necessary at this time, either from the standpoint of the government or the taxpayer.
70 Treasury Regulations 80, Article 11, provide that "nothing should be included (in the gross estate of a decedent), however, on account of a contingent remainder in the case that the contingency does not happen in the
lifetime of the decedent, and the interest consequently lapses at his death."
The inference is clear that if the interest has not lapsed at the death of the
decedent, the contingent remainder is taxable, even though the contingency
has not occurred at or prior to such time.
71 No attempt has been made to cite or analyze all of the decisions of
the Board of Tax Appeals dealing with the question here presented.

